LAIS

LONDON ACADEMY OF IRANIAN STUDIES

 

 

Heidegger and Social Theory: Dasein and Modes of Beings

 

By: Seyed Javad Meynagh

Copyright: LONDON ACADEMY OF IRANIAN STUDIES

 

 

 

Death is the key to life. Heidegger

 

 

 

Abstract

The controversial position of Heidegger continues to be one of the most intriguing dramas within academia. But the paramount idea of his discourse proves to be challenging to disciplinary intellectuals who are accustomed to reduce the question of death into a purely biographical (and hence private) issue without any fundamental connection to the texture of self in society (and the institutions which are established in running of the City). In this brief essay we have looked at some aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy in relation to modes of being which are of paramount significance for a rethinking of styles of intellectual discourses beyond the confines of academic disciplines.  

 

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) studied under Husserl. Heidegger was interested in the "question of being". He thought that western philosophy had been over obsessed with the problem of knowledge. For Heidegger the individual as being-in-the-world was characterized by action and anxiety: knowing the world is not our primary way of being in the world. In his later works, Heidegger became more interested in the history of concepts in language. He regarded his investigations as an attempt to disclose or uncover the concealed nature of being. His most fundamental question was: why should there be being at all, when there could be nothing? Although Heidegger claimed he was not an "existentialist", his influence on Sartre and the existentialist movement is undeniable.

 

 

The Core of Heidegger’s Philosophy

 

Martin Heidegger began as a recognized authority in the phenomenological movement and became an existentialist with theistic leanings. Heidegger based his philosophy upon the “hermeneutics of existence” — or the science of existence. The “scientific” method was that of phenomenological reduction. Kierkegaard accepted the paradox of being defining itself. But Heidegger could not accept this paradox and instead he attempted to break away out of this Kierkegaardian paradoxical way of thinking. According to Heidegger, a concept must be defined without using itself as reference. The difficulty of definition was confronted by defining “Being” as a collection of concepts.

 

 Dasein

According to Heidegger, human being -- as opposed to human beings -- is comprised of four components: concern, being-toward-death, existence, and moods. Dasein is the act of "being there" in essence. Without being something, there is no existence. Concern, or Sorge, is the ability to care about the self, in relation to phenomena. Being-toward-death, or Sein zum Tode, represents the finite nature of life. This belief that death defines life complements Søren Kierkegaard's thought that God does not exist, but is real. Existence, or Existenz, represents knowing one is and is changing. Finally, moods, or Stimmungen, are reactions to other beings, further allowing one to define the self. Dasein requires choices and resulting actions to define the self. These choices allow for an almost unlimited combination of the components of being. Each choice represents a pivotal point in the individual’s life -- every choice even the seemingly minor ones contribute to the larger definition of self. Choices occur in relation to a timeline, universal and personal. These points in time became the topic of Heidegger's Being and Time.

 

 Existence and Essence 

Heidegger like Kierkegaard and Sartre believed the existence of a physical body preceded the essence of self. At some point in the development process, a being becomes aware that it exists. This pivotal point in time is when essence begins to form; the individual decides to acknowledge and embrace an essence at this moment.

Because man is the only known being in which essence and existence does not appear simultaneously, man is a unique creature in this universe. All things man creates have essence, or definition, before they exist. In other words, an individual thinks about a creation and its purpose before the creation exists.

 

Dasien Sorge 

Dasien Sorge was Heidegger's phrase for concern and caring concerning the self and its existence. When confronted with the world and other beings, the human being feels anxiety and dread. The world appears multifarious and dangerous -- which it is. As a result, the individual, Dasien, must care for itself as no one else can or will. Taking care of the self is an indication that the individual recognizes dangers in the life. Recognizing threats demonstrates an appreciation of the physical self. It is sound to conclude that concern with the physical self precedes the awareness of concern for the emotional self. Whereas an infant might unconsciously want human contact, it only understands the need for food and other basic physical needs.

 

 

 Classes of Dasein Existence 

Being-there, Dasein, can be expressed in numerous fashions. The five modes of Dasein described by Heidegger are: authenticity, inauthenticity, everydayness, averageness, and publicness.

 

Authentic being represents a choice of self and achievement. All other modes represent a failing to embrace the individuality available to all people. Inauthenticity results from business, preoccupation, excitement, and other external forces. An inauthentic being is working to fit the definitions of others. Averageness takes hold when the individual no longer endeavors to attain and accepts a loss of differentiation. Everydayness represents a person no longer changing or making choices, but the individual might still be different from others. Many with achievement become everyday when they no longer attempt to excel. Publicness is the total loss of self for a public image. The individual conforms to preconceptions and opinions. Unlike the celebrity with one achievement, this individual repeats the same achievement over and over, thereby withdrawing from independence. An example would be a novelist with one style of expression, repeated with minor variations to please others. By avoiding the new, the different, the individual ceases to create and define a self that is an incessant becoming reality, which without Dasein is not but transformed totally to its opposite, if the opposite is conceivable at all.

 

Sein zum Tode: Toward Death 

The only testimony that an individual understands existence is the appreciation and embracement of death. While a child can understand the physical need for food, the known consequences of not eating are limited to hunger and illness. Death is a complex concept, incomprehensible to an immature existence. The instant one accepts death is the point when essence is brought into center of attention. Knowing that life is finite reinforces the magnitude of all further decisions. Poor choices result in the "Existential Guilt" of failure. For the existentialist, the worst of natural sins is a failure to define the self using free will. Guilt cannot be averted, however, because everyone fails to take some action, to make some choices.

 

Desire to Be

 Though life is filled with dread that the universe is not safe and guilt that life is ever complete, the human being has a desire to exist and define the self. For an existentialist the quest for authenticity is continuous. Whilst it cannot be perfected, as we coexist with other beings, individuals must toil to define themselves. Individuals make decisions knowing that others might seek to transform the universe around them. Business is unavoidable, as is a public role in the society. Only the most committed existential being can rise above these challenges to define the self, without regard to others.

 

Dasein and Social Theory

  

It would not be an exaggeration to state that grand many positions within social theory are influenced by the Cartesian dualism which has created a binary mindset within metatheoretical background assumptions of contemporary thought. Dasein as a key notion of theoretical analysis could prove constructive in overcoming the Cartesian dualism which had permeated much, but by no means all, of Enlightenment thinking. (Callinicos, 1999)

 

Some modern philosophers argue that the problem of traditional epistemology is the relation of subject to external world. The distinction between subject and object makes possible the distinction between the knower and what is known. Starting with Descartes, the subject is a thinking thing that is not extended, and the object is an extended thing which does not think. Heidegger, however, rejects this distinction between subject and object by arguing that there is no subject distinct from the external world of things because Dasein is essentially Being-in-the-world. Heidegger challenges the Cartesian legacy in epistemology in two ways. First, there is the modern tendency toward subjectivism and individualism that started with Descartes' discovery of the 'cogito.' Second, there is the technological orientation of the modern world that originated in the Cartesian understanding of the mathematical and external physical world.

 

While Heidegger accepts Descartes’ role as the first thinker in Western philosophical tradition who discovered the "cogito sum" as an indubitable and the most certain foundation and thereby destructed the harmonious relation between philosophy and theology by grounding his subjectivity on his epistemology nevertheless Heidegger maintains that Descartes' definition of "res cogitans" says to us that "res cogitans" is a res whose realities are representations. (1982. p 126) By challenging the Cartesian legacy in epistemology Heidegger is attempting to show that there is no subject distinct from the external world of things, because Dasein is essentially Being-in-the-world. Therefore, he puts together the separation of the subject and the object by the concept of "Dasein" which is essentially a Being-in-the-world. However, Being-in-the-world does not mean that it is like a piece of chalk in the chalk box. Being-in, as the most essential and existential characteristics of Dasein, signifies the expression of such terms as "dwelling," "being familiar with," and "being present to." By rejecting the distinction between the subject and the object he takes Dasein as the starting point because only Man is the Being who is aware of himself, of the world, and of Being, Dasein is the only Being which can gain access to this problem. Dasein is always aware of itself as being in a world. Dasein, which raises the question of Being, must be disclosed in its Being because it is different from other beings. Therefore, unlike the idea that man can be understood in terms of the concept "res extensa", i.e., in terms of its physical and mechanistic dimensions in the Cartesian model, Heidegger tries to shift the idea of subject from the Cartesian mechanistic interpretation of man to its more primordial sense of Being.

 

Furthermore, Heidegger investigates "knowing" in terms of its ontological basis. For this reason, Heidegger refutes the Kantian logical description of the possibility of knowledge and rejects the scientific explanation of things as present-at-hand. The Cartesian epistemology is the driving engine behind the disciplinary social theory and Heidegger thinks that we must go beyond the knowledge of present-at-hand and that we just reach the primordial knowledge of things present-at-hand which is ready-at-hand. Therefore, he tries to reveal a pre-understanding of present-at-hand. For him knowing without self-knowledge is unfathomable and for this very reason he rejects the metaphysics of modernity due to its uncritical stance. According to Heidegger, critical philosophy in modern times (such as the Kantian philosophy) is uncritical and dogmatic because, in beginning with the problem of knowledge, "the question of the kind of Being which belongs to the knowing subject is left entirely unasked." (1926. p 87)

 

 

Heidegger, contrary to the interpretation of pure subject, maintains that Dasein as Being-in-the-world is no longer a distinction between a subject and a set of objects which are to be known, but it is a relation because the definition of Dasein as a relation becomes concrete only as "Being-in-the-world." "Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world." (1926. p 368) However, this does not mean that ‘I’ has itself in view as being-in-the-world in the everyday manner because

 

… the everyday interpretation of the self... has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the world with which it is concerned. (1926. p 368)

 

In Heideggerian sense the subject has its meaning in "Being-already-in-the-world and in "Being-alongside-the-ready-to-hand-within-the-world" because the subject must be understood in terms of his authentic potentiality-for-Being; so, the subject is the basis of care and selfhood is possible in the authenticity of Dasein's Being as Care. (1926. p 369) Heidegger defines the traditional subjectum in terms of care and authentic potentiality-for-Being. This definition of the subject, in religious sense ambiguous though, has the primordial, existential and ontological basis for the question of the subject and its distinction from its object.

 

For Heidegger, the who-ness of the subject is in reference to the Dasein’s who-ness. That is to say I-hood and selfhood must be understood existentially and ontologically rather than existentially and ontically in its own Being as Being-in-the-world. Furthermore, if "I" is understood as a logical subject or a representation or a substance, then "I" means something always present-at-hand. If "I think something" is conceived as a basic characteristic of the self, then "I think something" is not enough ontologically as a starting point because "something" remains indefinite and "something" is conceived as an entity within-the-world. Therefore, for Heidegger, "I think" or "Cogito sum" remains as an isolated subject. (1926. p 368)

 

The Cartesian self is in no way capable of overcoming the ontological dichotomy which Heidegger discerns at the core of reifying process of modernity. In the place of Cogito Sum he posits Dasein's Being-in-the-world. By interpreting dualistic modern ontology in the concept of Dasein's Being-in-the-world Heidegger destroys phenomenologically the history of ontology in terms of his understanding of the Temporality of Being, and he reformulates the question of the meaning of Being, i.e., Dasein phenomenologically, temporally, hermeneutically, and existentially.

 

In reading Descartes as a metaphysician of modernity Heidegger problematizes the duality of Descartes and modern philosophy as appears in subject versus object (the world). Heidegger, instead, unifies the duality of modern philosophy by arguing that subject and object (world) belong together in the single entity Dasein. Subject and object are not two beings, because they are the basic determination of Dasein in the unity of the characteristic of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger turns around Descartes' Cogito Sum, and he holds that "Sum" must be asserted first. He formulates "I am-in-the-world" as an understanding of Being: In this sense, Dasein is not a cogito. Dasein and its world can never be separated. Dasein is the Being-in-the-world. Consequently, "I am-in-the-world" precedes the "cogito sum." The truth of cogito is replaced in the disclosedness of Being which is basically primordial truth. Unlike Descartes and others, he breaks the chain of the tradition in terms of an understanding of world. His understanding of Being is Being-in-the-world, but the world of the Being of Dasein is not the physical world. It is the world of Dasein. The world of Dasein belongs to it and this once applied to fundamental concepts of social theory it could revolutionarize the entire Metatheory of disciplinary social theory dramatically. (Richardson, 1986)

 

 

Reference

 

Callinicos, A. Social Theory. Cambridge,1999.

Heidegger, M. Being and Time, Trans. by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row Press, 1962.

Heidegger, M. Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. and Intr. by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

Richardson, J. Existential Epistemology: A Heideggerian Critique of Descartes Project, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

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