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Hegel and Social Theory: Geist and God within Hegelian Philosophy
By: Seyed Javad Meynagh Copyright: LONDON ACADEMY OF IRANIAN STUDIES
Abstract
The distinction between modern and traditional metaphysics is one of the most contesting debates in contemporary social theory and philosophy and nowhere is this distinction so unfolding than in Hegel’s discourse as he rightly is considered to be at the threshold of profanization of intellect and the initiator of the modernization of mind. To understand Hegel is to fathom the contours of secularization of mind and for this purpose we have attempted to engage with Hegel’s philosophy in relation to two fundamental concepts of God and Geist. Introduction The great minds of European Intellectual Tradition have been subjects of debates for a long time within the frame of secular episteme but the same has not been true in relation to religious episteme, namely we have had many interesting debates on Hegel or Kant from the point of secular logos but there have been very few systematic engagements from within religious episteme in general and Muslim Intellectual Tradition in particular. The question of philosophy has always been part and parcel of intellectual traditions in Iran (since the time of Magus Philosophers and Median Thinkers circa 6000 years ago) and Islamic World at large (since the engagements of Muslims with the World Heritage of Iran, India, Greece, China and so on) and there has never been a time in East where ideas were take at their face value. On the contrary, the flow of ideas has always been concomitant with a critical reassessment of any thought which was thought to be of a different origin culturally but not for that matter alien intellectually as Eastern philosophers have always believed in universal value of ideas regardless of their context of origins as long as they could withstand the test of critique. The question of Secular European Philosophy is a case which needs a more systematic approach due to the fact that the contemporary world system is claimed to be based on their ideas and we as Muslim Intellectuals need to engage with these ideas from within our religious episteme. This intellectual engagement is not without precedent among Muslim intellectuals and one can find a long tradition among Muslim intellectuals from Seyyed Jamal al-Deen Asadabadi via Iqbal to Muttahari, Shariati, Nasr, Taleghani, Beheshti, Allama Jafari, Allama Tabatabi, Shahid Baqir Sadr, Imam Musa Sadr, to Hasan Hanafi and so on and so forth. But there is one great fact missing and that is the absence of their collective effort as a system of research presented to the students at the universities as well as ways of improving our praxis in the world. However here we are going to look at Hegel and our approach would be informed by a sense of religious consciousness episteme which is distinct from the secular approaches to Enlightenment tradition. Of course the very notion of ‘religious consciousness’ need to be explained and systematically elaborated in an analytical as well as integral manner but this is a task which we would return to later on.[1] Along with J. G. Fichte and F. W. J. von Schelling, Hegel (1770-1831) belongs to the period of “German idealism” in the decades following Kant. The most systematic of the post-Kantian idealists, Hegel attempted, throughout his career to elaborate a comprehensive and systematic ontology from a “logical” starting point. He is perhaps most well-known for his teleological account of history, an account which was later taken over by Marx and “inverted” into a materialist theory of an historical development culminating in communism. For most of the twentieth century, the “logical” side of Hegel's thought had been largely forgotten, but his political and social philosophy continued to find interest and support. However, since early 1990s a postmodern interest in Hegel has been launched and his philosophy of religion seems to gain momentum again on a global scale as values based on religious traditions are becoming ever-increasingly significant on international stage.
Biography of Hegel Georg Wilhem Fredrick Hegel was born in August 27, 1770, in southwest Germany, in a town called Stuttgart. Throughout growing up and studying, he was known as "the old man" because of his strict study habits. However, he was not considered an exceptionally gifted student. Hegel received his Master of Philosophy degree in 1790 and then started to study for his theological exam. In September of 1793, he passed his theological exam, but was too poor to take up parish work so he became a tutor. He hated tutoring in the house of C.F. Tschügg, in Bern, Switzerland. However, the family did have a good library, which he used to advance his learning. In the early part of 1799, his sister sent him a note saying that their father had just "died quietly and peacefully. His father left him enough money to quit tutoring, and he became a Privatdozent at the University of Jena. In 1805, he was promoted to extraordinary professor. During this time Hegel was working on his masterpiece called, Phenomenology of Spirit. A friend of Hegel was re-organizing the schools in Bavaria, appointed Hegel rector and philosophy professor at the gymnasium in Nuremberg in the end of 1808. In the summer of 1812, Hegel's wife, Marie von Tucher, gave birth to a baby girl, who died only a few weeks later. However, in June of 1813, Karl, Hegel's son was born, and in September of 1814 his other son Immanuel was born. From 1812 to 1816 Hegel worked on his book, Science of Logic. In 1818, Kant accepted the second offer from the University of Berlin, working in the philosophy chair. Hegel traveled and lectured at the University of Berlin, until close to his death on November 14, 1831. Philosophy as a self-realization The division between philosophy and religion in Hegel's thought is not as sharp as with Disciplinary Episteme as Hegel's philosophy has been described as "a speculative metaphysics" which provides us "with a rational theodicy of modern social life" (Wood, 1990. p 8), although other scholars such as Solomon describe Hegel as "neither a metaphysician, in the old sense, nor a mystic" (1987. p 13). Robert C. Whittemore in 1960 made the argument that Hegel was "a panentheist," a Greek term which translates as "all in God" and that this God "is more than all the parts of the universe, but not separate from it [a non-transcendent God (Hardimon 1994. p 51)] ... [as] God needs the universe in the same way as a person needs a body" (Singer, 1983. p 82). Indeed, Hardimon writes: "In Hegel's view, God [which Hegel understands as absolute Geist] exists only as actualized in nature and becomes self-conscious only through the consciousness of human beings" (1994. p 51). In religious intellectual tradition philosophy is for life and it is to be lived and it ‘’… is not enough to know the truth; the truth must be lived. (Radhakrishnan, 1957. p xxiv) Thought in the bosom of religion is an action-philosophy which manifests itself in this praxis of awareness and action. Like the Wisdom Traditions, Hegel as well does not "distinguish between theory and practice" (Solomon, 1987. p 14). The individual defines herself or himself through her or his personal actions, with this particular action being a component "of a larger social process that systematically achieves the good" (Wood, 1990. p 50). Subjective freedom, as but an example, directly refers to a "kind of action, one that is reflective, conscious, explicitly chosen by the agent, as opposed to actions performed unthinkingly, habitually, or from concern (PR §§185R, 228R, 270R, 272R, 274, 301, 316; cf. PR §§132, 138, 140R).¨ Subjective freedom also includes actions that satisfy the agent's particular needs and interests" (Wood, 1990. p 38; cf PR §§121, 185R, 185A, 258R, 299R). This project of reconciling the person with her or his community, the reconciled individual cognizant of being at home in her or his social world, was Hegel's primary social and political philosophical goal (Plant, 1973. p 129), "and ... through a speculative cognition of the actual in its rationality in the effort to overcome a person's alienation" (Wood, 1990. p 6; cf PR Preface 27). The process by which one is reconciled to the social world is "a matter of taking a particular attitude toward the social world or of relating to the social world in a particular way" (Hardimon, 1994. p 17). The social world for Hegel's state is a particular kind of society, containing three institutions of the modern family, civil society, and the modern state. Singer writes: "So far as Hegel's conception of freedom is concerned, the particular institutional arrangements he prefers are not crucial ... He is interested in freedom in a deeper, more metaphysical sense" (1983. p 39).
Hegel's Conception of Geist Earlier we mentioned that Hegel understands God as the Absolute Geist which exists only as actualized in nature and becomes self-conscious only through the consciousness of human beings. Here we turn to his conception of Geist in a more systematic fashion. Solomon states that Hegel's conception of Geist "is an activity" as "Geist is the universal in action" (1987. p 12). This is to state that Geist, as universal reason, manifests change in the world through human agency by actualizing itself in what exists (Wood, 1990. pp 11; 46). As an activity, Geist gives subjective freedom content as it grounds subjectivity in the world by manner of Geist actualizing itself in the material world, through a person's labor. Wood claims that "Hegel seeks to overcome alienation by rationally reconciling us to the world, comprehending a divine reason, akin to our own, immanent in it" (1990. p 7). This divine reason which exists within, among and outside of us Hegel calls "Geist," translated as mind or as some kind of "general consciousness" which is common to everyone (Solomon, 1987. p 3). A pivotal idea of Hegel's mature philosophy, Hegel's philosophy can only be understood if we understand Geist (Solomon, 1987. p 3). Hegel's theory of self-identity in Geist might be described as "a theory in which I am something other than a person" (Solomon, 1987. p 3). Geist is appreciated as a dichotomy as the consciousness particular to individual persons and in and absolute form as "absolute Geist" where Geist is instead understood as a universal consciousness, or universal reason, belonging to the community of interdependent individuals. The social world is a home for its individual social members "if its essence is not fundamentally other than the essence of its members" (Hardimon, 1994. p 109). This Geist becomes, for Hegel, the instrument through which the individual may reconcile themself with her or his community, the social world. Hegel underscores this point when he states that The external subjectivity which is thus identical with me is the will of others ... The basis of the will's existence in now subjectivity, and the will of others is the existence which I give to my end, and which is for me at the same time an other ... The implementation of my end therefore has this identity of my will and the will of others within it (PR §112). Hegel's meaning here is that there is an entity (i.e., "the will of others") which is outside of myself as it is external but my will is a reflection of this external entity as it is "thus identical with me," the subjectivity of others being understood as "the will of others." However, the will of others is not an entity above or beyond that of the constituent persons from whom this "will of others" arises: This will is itself in "subjectivity," and not objectivity, and the will is a term to represent the conglomeration of particular and individual wills of particular individuals. Indeed, the groundwork, or "basis" as Hegel calls it, for this "will of others" is not in an abstraction but in the subjectivity of persons other than and including myself: This will of others is "the existence which I give to my end" and as well this will "is for me at the same time an other." The identity of this "will of others," this "external subjectivity," is an embodiment of "my will" and that of others within it. Still, Hegel's precise definition of what it means to be one and all in Geist in some kind of spiritual community or sharing a communal consciousness is debatable. Some scholars have challenged that, for Hegel, Geist is "neither metaphysical nor mystical" (Solomon, 1987. p 13). Hegel's "God," or absolute Geist (i.e., Geist in the most wholesome and imposing form) is "an essence that needs to manifest itself in the world, and having made itself manifest, to perfect the world in order to perfect itself" (Singer, 1983. p 83). In Hegel's system of thought, for example, "world history is nothing but the progress of consciousness of freedom" because "history is the development of mind" (Geist) (Singer, 1983. pp 24, 47). Hegel's abstractness and lack of definition makes his thought, a system whose foundation is in Hegel's conception of Geist, difficult to compare to rival Western systems with whom lack any similar conception of mind or spirit. Absolute Geist, for Hegel, is totally self-sufficient and "depends on nothing, needs nothing, and is bound by nothing ... fully self-actualizing and fully actualized in the world" (Hardimon, 1994. p 51). However it should be mentioned that this idea of Geist is importantly not unique to Hegel but part of the wisdom philosophy which has found its expression within various religious traditions of the globe such as Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and Christianity. In brief, Hegel's system of thought is impenetrable without an understanding of Geist as a fundamental cornerstone of the philosophy, which is an attempt to demonstrate that Geist exists in and manifests itself through this world and is not separate from it.
Consciousness and Reality Hegel like many other modern thinkers who broke away from revelation in its orthodox conception could not appropriate three levels of religiosity into his philosophy and saw organizations such as orthodox religion as "a barrier to the goal of restoring [the person] to a state of harmony, for it makes [the person] subordinate [her or his] own powers of thought to an external authority" (Singer, 1983. p 5). The only proper authority for both systems of thought is one's own reason. How Hegel discerns his world is idealistic as mind conditions, at the very least, matter since mind and matter are connected, so changing the mind through thinking inevitably affects the material surroundings and thence prosperity. In other words, as the mind is so is the world as the images created in meditation by the mind will have as much reality as anything else. In essentially the same manner and to use a similar metaphor, "actuality" stands "in need of purification", namely that which is, simply stated, actual may be defiled and may need to be transformed to something more in accordance with reason. Hegel argued that although the external social world "is not a construction of mind ... the human mind can appropriate it in thought and make it a structure which mirrors the human mind" (Plant, 1973. p 144), as stated in Hegel's Doppelsatz "[w]hat is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" (PR §12) and his famous statement, "[w]hat is … is reason" (PR §13). While prosaic, these statements are to be understood figuratively. Instead, one should recall Hegel's statement of "[w]hat is actual becomes rational, and the rational becomes actual" (Wood, 1990. p 13). As the human mind matures over time and gains in rationality, so too does universal reason existing as absolute Geist, a general and shared "consciousness." In this sense, a more accurate reading of the Doppelsatz would be: "What is rational becomes more actual in the sense of coming to be adequately realized in existing things" (Hardimon, 1994. p 64). For Hegel, "the content of the Idea (Idee) is fully realized in the world" (Plant, 1973. p 138). To put it differently, a person is in Hegel's philosophy "free," or in his terminology "with her or himself," when this person's desires and choices "harmonize with the practical system" (Wood, 1990. p 49; cf PR §19).
Self and Society in Hegel’s Thought Constantly fundamental to Hegel's concerns is "freedom" (Singer, 1983. p 25). Hegel's expression for his idea of freedom is Beisichsein (Beisichselbstsein) which translates as "being with oneself" (cf PR §23). The way in which Hegel uses the term Beisichsein for both freedom and reconciliation "enables him to encapsulate the view that freedom and reconciliation are essentially the same" (Hardimon, 1994. p 116). Correctly understood, freedom and reconciliation may thus be used interchangeably and the process to bring one concept about must inexorably bring as well the other concept and vice versa. The integration of the self with society is an imperative element of Hegel's social theory (cf PR §141). R. Plant stated that the "basic aim of Hegel's philosophical enterprise was ... to make [the individual] to feel at home in the world" in an "integrated, cohesive, political community" (1973. pp 135, 25). As a consequence, within an interdependent community an individual may become "at home" in that person's social world. The social world within which a person lives is a home to such an individual "if and only if it makes it possible for [the individual] to actualize" herself or himself as both an individual and as a members of her or his particular society (Hardimon, 1994. p 99). This project is one of Versöhnung, which is a term Hegel uses in the sense of "overcoming alienation" (Hardimon, 1994. p 2). Hardimon portrays such a reconciled person as "individual social members" who have undergone "reflective identification" (1994. pp 141, 166). The phrase "individual social members" is particularly well suited to Hegel's task of reconciliation as it recognizes the person as a community member as an individual and it recognizes this individual's interconnectedness as a "social member." Both the subjectivity and objectivity of an individual, the person's distinctiveness as an individual and as a partner in society with others, are the spheres of being through which one is reconciled and made to "feel at home" in the community in which the person lives. Such a community is as much a reflection of this individual as such an individual is a reflection of the society in which s/he lives. This social world is "strikingly inclusive" as it "is also a home for women and peasants" (Hardimon, 1994. p 131), even if men have more freedom than women. Within the community of persons, all are to be able to be at home in the community through which each individual person is reflected in the community's development. Additionally, the community is reflected in each and every person as each individual develops in Hardimon's aforementioned "reflective identification." When a person's world has become a social home, this world no longer bears the appearance of something alien from the person but instead this world appears as "an environment which progresses and develops ... [having] being in and of itself" (Plant, 1973. p 144). To be reconciled with such a world an individual must "regard social membership as an 'essential aspect' of their individuality and to regard their individuality as an 'essential aspect' of their social membership" (Hardimon, 1994. p 105). This reconciliation is internalized within Hegel's rational state where 'the interests of the individual and of the collective are in harmony" (Singer, 1983. p 43). People "are fully at home in the social world if and only if (i) the social world is a home, (ii) they grasp that the social world is a home, (iii) they feel at home in the social world, and (iv) they accept and affirm the social world" (Hardimon, 1994. p 95). Reflective identification represents, for Hegel, "the highest stage of social membership" as the individual attains a certain awareness of the complexity of interdependence between her or himself and her or his social world community (Hardimon, 1994. p 173; cf PR §147, R). Hegel's conception of individuals living in harmony in community and at home in the social world is reflected in the attainment of Reflective Identification. Hegel specifically grounds his social theory utilizing the interaction of individuals with each other through institutions of family, civil society, and the modern state and the attainment of harmony is achieved specifically through the expression of solidarity in human community. Avineri describes Hegel's state of reconciliation as "universal altruism" and as "a mode of relating to a universe of human beings not out of self-interest but out of solidarity, out of the will to live with other human beings in a community" (1972. p 134). It is to say that Hegelian theory is more focused on reconciliation through a socio-economic-political process of interaction and at times one feels that Hegel is inattentive to other aspects of social reality such as compassion and how significant role it does play in the constitution of self and society. However the project of reconciliation theorized by Hegel understood as both a particular process of one becoming conscious of the interdependence of herself or himself and the society and reconciliation as freedom are significant aspects of Hegel’s social theory, which could even prove constructive for intercivilizational dialogue. Final Remarks Hegel believed that the whole of history is the development of reason, and he attempted to describe it all. The idea of God as understood in Christian theology was reconstructed in a mystic jargon without any resort to Gnostic Intellect as this is understood within transcendental religious philosophy. Part of the intellectual structure that he provides is an analysis of society into three components, namely the state, the economy, and the family. Hegel's thought is frequently looked at as a background to that of Marx and Engels, but it is also of value in its own right. A very important fact about the character of Hegel’s philosophy is the absence of God as a Vital Reality, i.e. not only as a matter of cognition but as a driving force of Reality as it is crystallized in the form of existence (be it human or otherwise). Last but not least one should mention that in Hegel the Gnostic Cosmos turns into a Social Fabric which loses its sense of ‘wonder’ and ‘awe’. Reference Avineri, Shlomo (1972). Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hardimon, Michael O. (1994). Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hegel, G. W. F. (1996). Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plant, Raymond (1973). Hegel. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli and Charles A Moore (eds.) (1957). A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Singer, Peter (1983). Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Solomon, Robert C. (1987). From Hegel to Existentialism. New York: Oxford University Press. Whittemore, Robert C. (1960). "Hegel as Panentheist," Tulane Studies in Philosophy 9: 134-64. Wood, Allen W. (1990). Hegel's Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press |